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ABSTRACT 
 
The international community has come to criticize existing foreign aid practices 
for their poor coordination, misguided programming, and ineffective implementation 
strategies. China’s controversial aid policies pose an alternative to dominant Western aid 
paradigms, as they thwart conventions of conditionality and good governance paramount 
to traditional donors. This thesis evaluates Chinese health aid as an alternative to Western 
health aid via the impacts of each on sub-Saharan African health capacity, commitment to 
health, and overall health outcomes. Results indicate that Chinese aid does not 
significantly impact health in sub-Saharan Africa, while World Bank aid displays strong 
significant relationships with improvements to government commitment to health and 
overall health outcomes.  
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Introduction 
 For more than a decade, tension between Chinese and Western aid philosophies 
has increased with China’s rising influence in Africa. China’s development finance has 
been characterized by political non-interference and an emphasis on infrastructure. These 
policies contradict well-established Western aid strategies prioritizing good governance 
and donor conditionality, and have attracted a wide array of criticisms from Western 
donors and aid scholars alike.1 As such, the viability of Chinese aid has been fiercely 
debated, despite its ready acceptance by African governments. 
 China’s 2014 announcement of its plans for the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) represents an institutionalization of these highly contested Chinese aid 
practices. The United States has already criticized this action as a “deliberate effort to 
undercut the World Bank,” one that will fail to meet international safeguards or improve 
conditions in developing states.2 However, in gaining the support of traditional U.S. 
allies, including Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, China’s development bank, and 
consequently its development policies, have gained newfound credibility. This 
development represents a major step toward the validation of Chinese aid practices, as 
well as a potential blow to the Western aid paradigm, which has been ascendant since the 
founding of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.3  
 These recent events, in conjunction with criticism of Western aid practices from 
prominent scholars such as William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo, point to a potential 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Woods, Ngaire, "Whose Aid? Whose Influence? China, Emerging Donors and the Silent Revolution in 
Development Assistance," International Affairs 84, no. 6 (2008): 1205-1221. 
2 Perlez, Jane, "U.S. Opposing China’s Answer to World Bank," The New York Times, 2014. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/chinas-plan-for-regional-development-bank-runs-into-us-
opposition.html?_r=0 
3 Higgins, Andrew and David E. Sanger, "3 European Powers Say they Will Join China-Led Bank," The 
New York Times, 2015. 
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shifting authority in the world of development finance.4 As such, debates regarding the 
efficacy of Western and Chinese policies are ever more important. Aid effectiveness is 
notoriously hard to capture, making concrete analysis of these divergent practices a 
difficult task. Furthermore, China’s refusal to release official development finance 
information has made any quantitative evaluation of its practices nearly impossible. 
However, AidData, a think tank based at the College of William & Mary that specializes 
in the geocoding of development finance, has collected and released media-derived 
Chinese aid information.5 This new data finally allows scholars to empirically compare 
Chinese and Western aid. 
The following study analyzes the impact of Chinese aid vis-à-vis Western aid on 
health in sub-Saharan Africa. As per the 2005 Human Development Report, humanitarian 
endeavors are increasingly viewed as the primary purpose of foreign aid; thus, evaluation 
of health aid shall be the primary focus of this study.6 Additionally, 2015 marks an 
important juncture for health in developing countries: the culmination of the UN’s 
Millennium Development Goal initiative. Begun in 2000, the UN tasked states in 
development to improve a variety of health indicators by 2015. Among these indicators 
were maternal mortality, infant mortality, and other gauges of disease burden.  
However, with the initiative drawing to a close, many sub-Saharan African states 
have yet to meet the health targets set by the MDGs. All sub-Saharan African states have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Easterly presents a vehement criticism of conditional aid policies. Easterly, William. "The Cartel of Good 
Intentions: The Problem of Bureaucracy in Foreign Aid." The Journal of Policy Reform 5, no. 4 (2002): 
223-250. Moyo argues that developing countries are worse off as a result of aid dependence. Moyo, 
Dambisa. Dead Aid: Why Aid is Not Working and How There is A Better Way for Africa. Macmillan, 2009. 
5 Strange, Austin, Bradley Park, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya 
Ramachandran, "China's Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data 
Collection," Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 323 (2013). 
6 Williamson, Claudia R, "Foreign Aid and Human Development: The Impact of Foreign Aid to the Health 
Sector," Southern Economic Journal (2008): 188-207. 
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achieved declines to infant mortality since the 1990s, but children in rural or poor 
households are disproportionately affected and progress was not sufficient to meet the 
MDG for 2015. The state of maternal mortality is dismal; some sub-Saharan countries 
have made no improvements or have seen increases to maternal mortality ratios since 
1990.7 Even as the disease burden from HIV/AIDS and malaria is decreasing, Sub-
Saharan Africa bears an inordinate proportion of cases. Despite improvements and 
concerted effort on the part of many states, the region remains underequipped with 
medicine and vaccines, and measures to reinforce health personnel training and 
recruitment move slowly.8 As a result, the health care systems of sub-Saharan Africa 
often suffer from a lack of human resources, supplies, and infrastructure, as well as poor 
provider coordination and availability of treatment.9 Moving forward, sources of foreign 
aid must consider the effectiveness of their policies to better assist developing countries 
in achieving better health. Thus, this thesis evaluates predominant strategies for foreign 
assistance at a critical juncture in both aid and health development.  
More precisely, this paper analyzes the effect of Chinese health aid vs. World 
Bank health aid on health outcomes in a sample of sub-Saharan African countries. I 
conceive that health outcomes are fundamentally a function of a given government’s 
healthcare capacity, or its structural, financial, and personnel resources, and its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 MDG Report 2012: Assessing Progress in Africa Toward the Millennium Development Goals: United 
Nations Development Programme, 2012. 
http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/MDG/english/MDG%20Regional%20Reports/Africa/MDG 
8 "Health Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: What is their Status and Role in Meeting the Health Millennium 
Development Goals?" African Health Monitor no. 14 (2012). 
9 Travis, Phyllida, Sara Bennett, Andy Haines, Tikki Pang, Zulfiqar Bhutta, Adnan A. Hyder, Nancy R. 
Pielemeier, Anne Mills, and Timothy Evans, "Overcoming Health-Systems Constraints to Achieve the 
Millennium Development Goals," The Lancet 364, no. 9437 (2004): 900-906. 
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institutional commitment to health: its willingness to invest in its people.10 As such, I 
argue that Chinese and World Bank aid have differential effects on these two underlying 
pillars of healthcare due to fundamental differences in their aid policies.  
The aid policies of China and the World Bank diverge primarily in their use of 
tied aid and conditionality. Based on evaluation of each policy, I hypothesize that 
Chinese investment improves health capacity more effectively than that of the World 
Bank because of its employment of tied aid. Chinese tied aid bypasses governments by 
necessitating that Chinese contractors implement projects; aid delivered through Chinese 
firms avoids diversion by corrupt recipient governments. Furthermore, Chinese aid is 
typically allocated towards infrastructure projects to directly improve capacity, without 
addressing government incentives.11 Conversely, World Bank aid should impact 
commitment to a greater degree than Chinese aid due to policies of conditionality. 
Western conditionality frequently mandates that a recipient state achieve standards for 
good governance when they receive aid. In doing so, recipient states that accept Western 
aid are compelled to improve their bureaucratic standards and accountability ratings, 
hopefully to the benefit of health commitment. But, such requirements may hinder 
capacity improvements by imposing a heavy bureaucratic toll on developing states.12  
To test the differential effects of Chinese and World Bank aid policies in sub-
Saharan Africa, I undertake a regression analysis of aid on health indicators in Angola, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Becker, Loren, Jessica Pickett, and Ruth Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health." Global Health 
Indicators Working Group Report, Washington DC, USA: Centre for Global Development (2006). 
11 Walz, Julie and Vijaya Ramachandran, "Brave New World: A Literature Review of Emerging Donors 
and the Changing Nature of Foreign Assistance," Center for Global Development Working Paper no. 273 
(2011). 
12 Easterly, William, "The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 2002.  
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and Tanzania. Controlling for socioeconomic status in these sub-Saharan African states, I 
estimate the impact of capacity and commitment variables on health outcomes, the 
impact of aid on capacity and commitment, and the overall relationship of Chinese aid vs. 
Western aid on health outcomes. Findings suggest no significant relationship between 
Chinese aid and health or indicators for capacity and commitment. World Bank aid, on 
the other hand, is significantly related to improvements in government commitment to 
health and overall life expectancy, as well as declines in infant and maternal mortality. 
However, further research is necessary to determine whether or not World Bank health 
aid has a causal impact on improvements to government commitment or overall health.  
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Literature Review 
The Political Determinants of Poor Health  
Public health capacity and government commitment to good health are primary 
contributors to the health of a nation. Public health capacity involves the “organizational, 
human, and financial resources that enable responsible authorities to improve health.”13 
Government commitment to health describes a state’s willingness to rule justly and make 
investments for the health of its citizenry.14 Unfortunately, many states in sub-Saharan 
Africa lack either or both capacity and commitment. According to Mick Moore of the 
Institute of Development Studies, these deficiencies stem mostly from political 
underdevelopment, which originates from regimes that are ineffective in pursuing 
collective interest and are “arbitrary, despotic, and unaccountable.”15  
Moore relates political deficiency in African states to both their colonial 
formation and current sources of revenue.16 States formed as colonies were at one point 
led by local elites dependent on external control; this institutionalized a trend of rule with 
little regard for the concerns of domestic citizens.17 Angolan healthcare, for example, is 
plagued by poor service distribution as a result of its colonial roots. Its colonial health 
system catered only to Portuguese colonists and settlers and failed to address the needs of 
the entire population; this inequity was passed down to the current system, which was 
developed hurriedly after prolonged civil war.18 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13Aluttis C.A., Chiotan C., Michelsen M., Costongs C., and Brand H., Public Health Capacity in the EU: 
European Commission Directorate General for Health and Consumers, 2013, 13. 
14 Becker, Pickett, and Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006. 
15 Moore, Mick, "Political Underdevelopment: What Causes ‘Bad Governance’," Public Management 
Review 3, no. 3 (2001): 385-418. 6.  16	  Moore, Mick,  “Political Underdevelopment,” 2001.	  
17 Berry, Sara, "Tomatoes, Land and Hearsay: Property and History in Asante in the Time of Structural 
Adjustment," World Development 25, no. 8 (1997): 1225-1241. 
18 Angola Health System Assessment: USAID, 2010. http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadx702.pdf 
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Since independence, external dependencies have further eroded government 
capacity and incentives in sub-Saharan African states.  Post-colonial states have relied on 
economies driven by mineral exports and foreign aid to generate revenue. Mineral 
exports and foreign aid are examples of unearned income, which the government can 
access without the help or support of the population. When government elites can receive 
income without citizen labor or taxation, government incentives to engage in domestic 
bargaining and to practice transparency in public revenue and expenditure are limited.19 
These mechanisms contribute to a lack of institutional impetus for sub-Saharan 
governments to engage in effective public health decision-making.20 
It is important to note, however, that many states in sub-Saharan Africa have 
made great strides to achieve democracy and economic liberalization and to improve 
government commitment to domestic interest. Ghana, in particular, made a concerted 
effort to liberalize its economy in the 1980s, and removed price controls, privatized state 
agencies, and removed government monopolies over the cocoa industry.21 Botswana has 
seen considerable institutional and economic success, in allowing “a broad cross-section 
of society to participate in the development process.”22 Kenya has also engaged in 
initiatives to promote democratic values and civic engagement among citizens.23 Such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Unearned income exists in contrast to earned income, which involves a state apparatus working in 
conjunction with citizens to generate revenue. This necessitates domestic bargaining, and ultimately, 
democracy and civil liberties. Moore, Mick,  “Political Underdevelopment,” 2001. 
20 Nattrass, N, "Are Country Reputations for Good and Bad Leadership on AIDS Deserved? An 
Exploratory Quantitative Analysis," Journal of Public Health (Oxford, England) 30, no. 4 (Dec, 2008): 
398-406. 
21 Berry, Sara, "Tomatoes, Land and Hearsay,” 1997. 
22 Hillbom, Ellen, "Botswana: A Development-Oriented Gate-Keeping State," African Affairs 111, no. 442 
(2012): 83. 
23 Finkel, Steven E. and Amy Erica Smith, "Civic Education, Political Discussion, and the Social 
Transmission of Democratic Knowledge and Values in a New Democracy: Kenya 2002," American 
Journal of Political Science 55, no. 2 (2011): 417-435. 
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advancements indicate increasing commitment to societal welfare in many sub-Saharan 
African states.  
Even as these institutional changes have shifted incentives toward public goods 
provision, potentially increasing demonstrated commitment to healthcare, capacity may 
still be lacking.24 Sub-Saharan Africa suffers from a brain drain of medical personnel, 
and some states are “scientifically lagging” due to poor research capabilities.25 Anemic 
economies result in both low health funding and dilapidating health infrastructure.26 
Violence and ethnic conflict contribute to the destruction of health infrastructure and the 
targeting of medical personnel in politically motivated attacks.27 Additionally, many sub-
Saharan governments are unable to organize health services country-wide given the 
prevalence of under-administered territories.28 These factors contribute to the dearth of 
human and financial capital allocated towards regional health.  
However, the chief hindrances to improved health capacity in sub-Saharan Africa 
are social, economic, and political imbalances. Health inequality results from the 
“unequal distribution of power, prestige, and resources” within a society.29 Many low- 
and middle-income countries maintain large disparities in economic status between social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 This deficiency is common among sub-Saharan countries, and is particularly demonstrable with regard to 
the HIV epidemic. Ugandan President Museveni, for example, was praised for his commitment to raising 
HIV awareness, but inefficiencies in HIV interventions limited Uganda’s ability to combat HIV. Natrrass, 
“Are Country Reputations for Leadership on AIDS Deserved,” 2008.  
25 Medical personnel in sub-Saharan Africa receive low income, low social security and benefits, poor job 
satisfaction and career opportunities, very little protection, and high risk. Dovlo, Delanyo, "The Brain 
Drain and Retention of Health Professionals in Africa," 2003. On research capacity: Volmink, J. and L. 
Dare, "Addressing Inequalities in Research Capacity in Africa," BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 331, no. 7519 
(Oct 1, 2005): 705-706. 
26 Doylo, Delanyo, “The Brain Drain in Africa,” 2005. 
27 Pedersen, Duncan, "Political Violence, Ethnic Conflict, and Contemporary Wars: Broad Implications for 
Health and Social Well-Being," Social Science & Medicine 55, no. 2 (2002): 175-190. 
28 Bratton, Michael and Eric CC Chang, "State Building and Democratization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Forwards, Backwards, Or Together?" Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 9 (2006): 1059-1083. 
29 Marmot, Michael," Achieving Health Equity: From Root Causes to Fair Outcomes," The Lancet 370, no. 
9593 (2007): 1153-1163. 
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strata, and health systems frequently fail to cater to socially disadvantaged groups. In a 
vicious cycle, socioeconomic status largely determines one’s health, but public money is 
too often allocated to health services for the wealthy. Without subsidized care, the poor 
either decline to use services or risk impoverishment when they need medical attention. 
Institutionalized gender inequity also obstructs health capacity; underrepresentation of 
women in government, as well as socially condoned sexual violence, unequal access to 
property and assets, and female disempowerment contribute to poor female health status, 
and uneven capacity. Thus, even well-intentioned health systems can “perpetuate 
injustice and social stratification.”30 
 
Traditional Health Aid  
In response to persistent health crises in Africa, foreign donors have offered 
economic assistance to improve African governments’ health capacity and realign 
incentives to strengthen institutional commitment.31 Western multilateral institutions and 
bilateral donors dominate the traditional aid landscape. These actors extend aid to 
developing countries via Official Development Assistance (ODA). The Development 
Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD defines ODA by strict guidelines. ODA must 
be issued by an official sector, include concessional provisions, and promote economic 
development and welfare.32 The DAC emphasizes transparency, social and environmental 
protections, decreased corruption, good governance, and debt management as essential 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Marmot,  “Achieving Health Equity,” 2007.  
31 Williamson, Claudia R, "Foreign Aid and Human Development: The Impact of Foreign Aid to the Health 
Sector," Southern Economic Journal (2008): 188-207. 
32 Manning, Richard, "Will ‘Emerging Donors’ Change the Face of International 
Cooperation?" Development Policy Review 24, no. 4 (2006): 371-385. 
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components of development finance.33 DAC bilateral donors frequently participate in 
multilateral institutions, emphasize social sector assistance, and employ traditional donor-
recipient relationships.34  
Traditional sources of development assistance regard health and humanitarian 
efforts as an essential function of aid. As such, Western multilateral organizations and 
bilateral actors have increasingly attempted to address health in developing countries 
with highly regulated programming. From 1999 to 2006, total aid to the health sector 
more than doubled. DAC health aid is implemented in large part through multi-country 
initiatives, and 95% of DAC health projects valued at more than $10 million. The 
majority of Western aid involves activities relevant to the Millennium Development 
Goals, such as projects targeting tuberculosis, malaria, HIV, and reproductive health and 
family planning.35  
Conditionality is a pillar of Western aid; donors attempt to reform ruler incentives 
by offering assistance only if certain standards of good governance or, for example, if 
health-spending targets, are met.36 Donors have facilitated structural adjustment in sub-
Saharan Africa to improve economic efficiency, and thus, improve health and other 
services.37 Donors have also attempted to relax budget constraints to increase government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 China, Africa and the International Aid Architecture, African Development Bank, 2010. 
34 Walz and Ramachandran, "Brave New World,” 2011. 
35 Williamson, Claudia R, "Foreign Aid and Human Development,” 2008. 
36 Good governance, in the context of health, refers to “accountability, transparency, and informational 
openness; an open, responsive, and evidence-based policy process; inclusion of citizens’ views and voice; 
and operation capacity of government to plan, manage, and regulate policy, financial resources, and service 
delivery.” Rwanda Health Governance Assessment: USAID, 2010, 12. 
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s18413en/s18413en.pdf 
37 Sahn, David and Rene Bernier, "Have Structural Adjustments Led to Health Sector Reform in 
Africa?" Health Policy 32, no. 1 (1995): 193-214. 
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spending on health systems.38 In this way, traditional donors seek to improve health by 
offering aid in exchange for improved ruler commitment to citizen well-being.   
Conditionality also functions to improve state capacity. Traditional donors tend to 
address issue-specific aid. For example, large financial commitments have been made 
based on issues like technical cooperation and HIV/AIDS.39 By requiring good 
governance, donors address democracy measures, accountability, and corruption in 
developing states.40 These factors strengthen the capability of recipient governments and 
improve health service delivery.41 Thus, Western donors primarily address capacity 
building by implementing issue-specific aid alongside interventions to improve 
government commitment.  
However, traditional aid policies have increasingly been the target of criticism, 
which much of it aimed at policies of conditionality.42  Aid delivery is complex and 
donors often struggle to determine what conditions will sustain growth and 
development.43 Also, donors frequently fail to specify the sanctions that recipients will 
receive if they do not comply with conditions. Not only do these failures undermine the 
credibility of conditionality, but they make monitoring and evaluation difficult.44 
Additionally, aid may fall prey to the moral hazard problem, hindering the effectiveness 
of conditionality. Moral hazard with respect to foreign aid “implies a situation in which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Mishra, Prachi and David Newhouse, "Does Health Aid Matter?" Journal of Health Economics 28, no. 4 
(2009): 855-872. 
39 Piva, Paolo and Rebecca Dodd, "Where Did All the Aid Go? An In-Depth Analysis of Increased Health 
Aid Flows Over the Past 10 Years," Bulletin of the World Health Organization 87, no. 12 (2009): 930-939. 
40 Singh, Ajit, "Aid, Conditionality and Development," Development and Change 33, no. 2 (2002): 295-
305. 
41 Mishra, Prachi, and Newhouse, “Does Health Aid Matter?” 2009.  
42 It is important to note that because multilaterals place a greater stake on conditionality than do bilateral 
donors, failures of conditionality are much more present in multilateral aid. Ram, Rati, "Roles of Bilateral 
and Multilateral Aid in Economic Growth of Developing Countries," Kyklos 56, no. 1 (2003): 95-110. 
43 Radelet, Steven, "A Primer on Foreign Aid," Center for Global Development Working Paper 92, (2006). 
44Adam, Christopher S. and Jan Willem Gunning, "Redesigning the Aid Contract: Donors’ Use of 
Performance Indicators in Uganda," World Development 30, no. 12 (2002): 2045-2056. 
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having an insurance policy (or in this case, access to external resources) actually induces 
riskier (undevelopmental) behavior” on the part of the recipient state. 45 Successful 
conditionality requires strong donor commitment to counter the moral hazard problem 
that deters recipients from implementing reforms. However, no such commitment 
technology exists; as such, there is low effort on the part of donors to ensure that aid is 
fully implemented.46  
The good governance standards imposed by conditionality also involve onerous 
bureaucracy for recipient states. Rich countries, including DAC donors, are responsible 
for the funding of multilateral aid agencies. DAC donors define aid output as money 
disbursed rather than service delivered, and evaluate aid effectiveness in short-term 
progress. Thus, to ensure continued funding, aid agencies are increasingly implementing 
elaborate bureaucratic controls on their projects to minimize the risk of corruption and 
provide guarantees to taxpayers at home that the money is well-spent. In doing so, they 
produce low-return observable outputs like reports and frameworks and burden the low 
administrative capabilities of poor countries. Recipients cannot handle the many 
authorizations, pressures, and requirements imposed by donors due to limited capability 
and a shortage of expertise.47 These controls also prolong aid delivery, contributing to aid 
inefficiency.  
Additionally, while donors seek to increase government health spending by 
relaxing budget constraints, empirical analysis demonstrates that this action actually 
achieves the opposite. A Lancet study finds that development assistance for health to a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Bräutigam, Deborah A. and Stephen Knack, "Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub‐Saharan 
Africa," Economic Development and Cultural Change 52, no. 2 (2004): 255-285. 263 
46 Svensson, Jakob, "When is Foreign Aid Policy Credible? Aid Dependence and Conditionality," Journal 
of Development Economics 61, no. 1 (2000): 61-84. 
47 Easterly, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 2002.   
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state may decrease government health spending. In the presence of health aid, ministries 
of finance choose to reduce health financing to allocate funds elsewhere. Developing 
countries seem to treat health aid as a substitution for, rather than a supplement to, 
government health spending.48 This produces states that are dependent on aid to maintain 
health security, ultimately undermining the key rationale for aid in the first place – 
improving the quality and the self-sufficiency of healthcare systems.49  
Rather than improve capacity, Western aid may exacerbate aid inequity or be 
limited in its effectiveness.50 Efforts to bolster health service capacity can be affected by 
aid fragmentation.51 Fragmentation is the result of poor donor coordination among the 
many multilateral and bilateral actors working in developing regions. Many donors try to 
implement projects with conflicting goals and policies in one area, overwhelming 
resources and producing uneven results; certain sectors of the population fall through the 
cracks. To make matters worse, many donors have poor monitoring and evaluation 
procedures, and do not recognize their own inefficiencies.52  Also, multilateral aid in 
particular is subject to the principal-agent problem.53 Whereas bilateral donors form 
closer, long-standing relationships with recipients, distant multilateral-recipient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 Lu, Chunling, Matthew T. Schneider, Paul Gubbins, Katherine Leach-Kemon, Dean Jamison, and 
Christopher JL Murray, "Public Financing of Health in Developing Countries: A Cross-National 
Systematic Analysis," The Lancet 375, no. 9723 (2010): 1375-1387. 
49 Additionally, this effect threatens the continuation of aid. Donors may lose accountability if development 
assistance for health does not lead to greater health spending, and may not be able to convince constituents 
of the value of continuing such aid. Lu, Schneider, Gubbins, Leach-Kemon, Jamison, and Murray, “Public 
Financing of Health in Developing Countries,” 2008. 
50 Radelet, “A Primer on Foreign Aid,” 2006.  
51 Buse, Kent and Gill Walt, "Aid Coordination for Health Sector Reform: A Conceptual Framework for 
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relationships involve long and complex chains to link taxpayers with the ultimate 
beneficiaries of aid.54 
Mere increases to the amount of health aid do not necessarily improve capacity. 
Donors – more frequently bilateral than multilateral – tend to align aid targets with their 
own goals rather than with recipient needs.55 Popular issue areas such as HIV/AIDS or 
technical cooperation receive a large share of health aid, but little is spent on the actual 
strengthening of health systems. These misaligned priorities may undermine the 
promotion of low-profile, yet absolutely essential health services in developing 
countries.56 Both multilateral and bilateral donors act on their own perception of altruism, 
but bilateral donors tend to structure aid around their own national interests and engage 
with states and issues of political strategic significance.57 
 
How has Traditional Aid Changed? 
Western aid bodies attempted to address these shortcomings via the Paris 
Declaration. In 2005, member states of the DAC met and resolved to increase aid 
accountability, improve specification project timetable and targets, tailor projects to 
individual countries, and improve project monitoring and evaluation. Additionally, 
members sought to increase recipient country ownership of aid projects, strengthen 
development capacity, and simplify aid implementation in fragile states.58  
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But, donors have been slow or reluctant to follow through on these promised 
reforms. And beyond poverty reduction, DAC donors have not made significant progress 
toward the goals of the Paris Declaration.59 Donors continue to enforce safeguards and 
standards that prolong aid delivery, and donor coordination remains weak.60 While 
Western sources of aid have scaled back their use of conditional policies, conditionality 
still exists in weaker forms.61 
Empirical analysis of DAC aid identifies further fallacies in aid implementation. 
Western aid bodies determine spending priorities at global and regional levels rather than 
those of recipient countries. 25% of ODA is allocated to multi-country projects, 
indicating that initiatives are not supportive of individual state needs.62 Additionally, 
living standards in developing countries have not increased, despite increasing aid.63  
Thus, Western aid continues to suffer from poor coordination between development 
partners and high transaction costs at the expense of recipient needs and living 
conditions.  
 
Chinese Aid 
In the last decade, China has assumed a prominent role as a donor to sub-Saharan 
Africa, but China’s approach to development contradicts that of Western institutions. 
China regards the traditional donor-recipient relationship championed by the West as a 
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“new form of colonialism.”64 Instead, China emphasizes its desire to form development 
partnerships with recipient states: partnerships rooted in mutual respect for sovereignty, 
non-aggression, and non-interference.65  
China’s practice of non-interference with recipient politics implies a rejection of 
aid conditionality; Chinese development policies do not require the improvement of 
governance in developing states. They impose fewer requirements and safeguards on aid 
recipients, thus easing bureaucratic requirements and improving the speed of aid 
implementation. Chinese aid also addresses capacity problems in developing countries 
through the use of distinct, tailored projects. Such initiatives are more efficiently targeted 
towards recipient needs, rather than the multi-country regional initiatives implemented 
more frequently by Western donors.66  
Chinese aid primarily targets energy, water and sanitation, education, private 
sector operations, and health. It attempts to improve productive capabilities and reduce 
supply-side constraints and transaction costs by emphasizing infrastructure development. 
These infrastructure projects are implemented with tied aid; construction requires the use 
of Chinese contractors. Thus, China finances its own companies to implement projects, 
rather than extending funds to recipient institutions.67 This strategy bypasses host 
governments, potentially avoiding failures of aid delivery due to misguided state 
incentives or poor implementation capacity.  
China’s health aid may be especially involved given China’s employment of 
‘health diplomacy.’ Health diplomacy involves political activity to improve health while 
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maintaining and strengthening international relations.68 China has sought increased 
political and economic influence in Africa, as well as access to natural resources. In 
doing so, China has assumed a prominent place in supporting African healthcare systems. 
Among other things, China’s health diplomacy has directly financed new hospitals, teams 
of medical professionals, and the promotion of effective malaria treatments on the 
continent.69 
 
Chinese Aid in Practice  
Western attitudes towards China’s unconventional aid strategies are 
predominantly negative. China’s rejection of conditionality has generated the greatest 
criticism.70 Additionally, critics worry Chinese aid may renew indebtedness in low-
income countries, and that attractive Chinese policies will replace the Washington 
Consensus with a ‘Beijing Consensus.’71 This shift will reverse the progress of 
established donors in replacing conditional aid with “artificial lifelines” that allow 
recipients to delay reforms for sustainable progress.72 Renewed indebtedness and poor 
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system governance may unravel achievements made to health governance and resources 
available to build capacity. 
 Critics also point to insufficient labor and environmental standards as a failure of 
unconditional Chinese policy. Moises Naim asserts that Chinese technology employed in 
development yields harmful environmental effects. Chinese infrastructure projects 
undercut the greener standards of agencies like the World Bank with lower benchmarks 
and “fewer questions.”73 Additionally, Chinese firms operating in African states 
supposedly turn a blind eye to poor labor relations, under-hiring of African citizens, and 
violence between Chinese migrants and locals.74 By ignoring standards, China offers aid 
that is equal parts “toxic” and “enormously generous.”75  
 China’s financing of rogue states creates further fodder for international criticism. 
China declines to intervene in recipient politics, to the chagrin of established, Western 
donors.76 For example, China ignored humanitarian infractions on the part of the 
Sudanese government in exchange for oil concessions, and continues to provide arms and 
political support to nondemocratic regimes.77 Thus, opponents of Chinese aid maintain 
that unconditional policies weaken state capacity and do not alter ruler incentives to 
produce good governance or improved commitment to health.  
 Ngaire Woods, however, presents a robust defense of China’s development 
practices, calling criticisms “overplayed.”78 Woods contends the international community 
has overestimated the efficacy of conditionality. As such, accusations of Chinese 	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negligence are often based on flawed pretense. Additionally, aid from emerging donors 
has not precipitated economic disaster or indebtedness in recipients.79 The corruptive 
influence of Chinese practices appears to be fabricated as well; in fact, corruption 
indicators have improved in some recipients of Chinese aid.80 Deborah Brautigam’s 
seminal work points out that good governance cannot be bought. While China may not be 
reducing corruption in Africa, it is not making it worse.81 
 Additionally, scholars argue that China does not extend blind funding to rogue 
states. China has supported Zimbabwe by providing aid and military equipment and 
vetoing UN sanctions after the 2008 election scandal, but has since begun to restrict its 
support.82  Moreover, DAC donors extend the largest amounts of aid to the same states as 
China; if China is financing corruption, so is the West.83 Skeptics also hyperbolize the 
nature of the labor practices and standards associated with Chinese infrastructure 
projects; 84 China has begun to integrate multinational standards to improve its own 
policies and those of its subsidiaries.85 According to Peter Drysdale, Australian 
economics professor and government advisor, concerns about Chinese standards are 
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“nonsense.”86 Though standards can differ between Chinese firms, most seek to respect 
local labor laws and conditions.87 
 Critics paint China as an ill-intentioned, resource-seeking imperialist. However, 
supporters of Chinese policies point out that China’s interest in Africa is based on a 
history of cooperation created in terms of solidarity and development. Chinese aid to 
Africa is now entwined with geopolitical agendas, intended for economic cooperation as 
well as resource acquisition. In fact, China’s behavior is no different than that of previous 
resource-hungry industrial powers. Additionally, scholars have suggested that “China 
bashing” is itself an exercise of Western interest.88  Western criticisms of Chinese aid are 
the result of a greater ideological battle rather than legitimate concern for aid recipients.89  
 Proponents of Chinese aid assert its theoretical effectiveness. China’s 
infrastructure projects and use of tied aid has streamlined the delivery process to produce 
quick and tangible results.90 Tied aid also resolves the commitment problem inherent to 
conditionality by delegating aid implementation to a third party, and eliminates the risk 
that a developing government might misuse funds or fail to achieve project completion.91 
Also, Chinese infrastructure projects do not inundate local organizations with unworkable 
bureaucratic requirements.92 Chinese firms pay for oil and other resources necessary for 
project completion, allowing fewer opportunities for cash diversion.93 In this way, well-
executed tied aid thwarts corruption and encourages efficient capacity building. 
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China prioritizes recipient participation and country ownership in their aid 
negotiations. Not only does greater country ownership increase aid effectiveness, but 
African leaders also appreciate the gesture.94 According to Festus Mogae, former 
President of Botswana, “the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former 
subjects.”95 African states also appear receptive to China’s extension of health 
diplomacy, regularly signing treaties inviting medical teams on a bi-annual basis, helping 
to cover the cost of their stays, and awarding medical teams with national honors.96 
 The current literature regarding Chinese aid offers suggests its effectiveness based 
on theoretical advantages over more traditional sources. However, the Chinese 
government has restricted access to its development finance records; because this data is 
unavailable to the public, there is little empirical evidence that speaks to the impact of 
Chinese aid on development. As such, it is difficult to determine the effect of Chinese aid 
on health using available resources.  
 
Synthesis 
 At base, the Chinese and Western models of aid differ primarily in their use of 
conditionality and tied aid. Western sources of aid, particularly multilateral organizations, 
emphasize the need for conditionality and good governance in aid transactions; China, on 
the other hand, prioritizes noninterference in recipient politics. Additionally, while a 
small percentage of Western aid is tied to donor-country contractors, the majority of 
Chinese aid is implemented this way.  
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Tied aid and conditionality strive to improve health-related government incentives 
and capacity in fundamentally different ways. Conditionality may increase ruler 
incentives to engage in health system reform by improving governance, but may 
negatively impact capacity via bureaucratic demands, poor monitoring and evaluation, 
and prolonged periods of aid delivery. 97 Tied aid does not address ruler behavior, but 
rather bypasses government to implement aid quickly and without corruption.98  
Thus, I hypothesize that Western aid, in its employment of conditionality, 
produces larger impacts on a government’s incentive to improve health care, indicated by 
several variables for health spending, health policies, and government accountability. 
However, Western conditionality may have little or negative impact on recipient health 
capacity; capacity is measured with variables for health personnel, infrastructure, and 
equipment coverage. Chinese development assistance, on the other hand, may not 
influence ruler incentives in its employment of tied aid, but it improves capacity to a 
greater degree than Western aid. Table 1 summarizes these arguments.  
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Table 1: Hypotheses  
  
Institutional Commitment 
 
Capacity 
 
World Bank 
Health Aid 
 
H1: World Bank health aid 
improves institutional 
commitment to health.  
 
Conditionality increases 
institutional commitment 
encouraging improved 
governance.  
 
 
H1: World Bank health aid has no 
effect on or decreases health capacity.  
 
Conditionality imposes a bureaucratic 
toll on developing states that 
prolongs aid delivery and hinders 
capacity.  
 
Chinese 
Health Aid 
 
 
H2: Chinese health aid has 
no effect on institutional 
commitment.  
 
Tied aid bypasses recipient 
governments during aid 
implementation through the 
use of Chinese contractors.  
 
 
H2: Chinese health aid improves 
health capacity.  
 
Discrete, infrastructure-related 
projects and the bypass of weak 
governments allows for speedy aid 
implementation and lessened risk of 
fund diversion.  
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Methodology and Operationalization of Health Outcome Measures 
This paper analyzes the effect of World Bank and Chinese health aid on health 
outcomes in twelve African countries. Health outcomes are fundamentally a function of a 
given government’s capacity and institutional commitment to provide healthcare. As 
summarized in Table 1, I hypothesize that World Bank aid and Chinese health aid impact 
health outcomes differently based on the degree to which they affect capacity and 
commitment.  
This analysis first establishes the impact of recipient capacity and commitment on 
health. Health is quantified with three variables: infant mortality per 1,000 live births, 
number of maternal deaths, and life expectancy at birth.99 Infant mortality is the primary 
indicator of health in developing states; infant mortality is highly sensitive to economic 
conditions, and it is dependent on a number of societal factors including fertility, water 
and sanitation, maternal health, female literacy, and GDP. Additionally, data on infant 
mortality is widely available. Thus, infant mortality is demonstrative of a number of 
human development outcomes, and its relationship with health aid is easier to determine 
than that of other health variables.100  
Similarly, maternal mortality is an effective indicator of the overall status of health 
systems; pregnant women are more likely to survive childbirth in safe and clean 
environments with access to both well-trained staff and surgical equipment. 101 This 
measure is usually calculated using a maternal mortality ratio (maternal deaths per live 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 I obtained all variables describing health from the World Bank Development Indicators database. While 
the World Bank collects data describing maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000 births), this data is sparse. 
Data for number of maternal deaths is more complete; while this variable does not provide information as 
to total births, it describes trends in maternal mortality. World Bank Group, ed, World Development 
Indicators 2014, World Bank Publications, 2014.  
100 Mishra, Prachi, Newhouse, “Does Health Aid Matter?” 2009. 
101 Garrett, Laurie, "The Challenge of Global Health," Foreign Affairs (2007): 14-38. 
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births). However, World Bank data for this variable was very limited, so this analysis 
measures maternal mortality with the number of maternal deaths per year. While this 
measure does not provide a sense of country comparison (it does not account for differing 
fertility rates/populations across countries), it does lend insight into in-country trends as 
to the state of maternal health.  Life expectancy is also indicative of a nation’s public 
health standing, given that children and adults thrive in environments with clean water, 
ample food, and, for example, well-controlled mosquito populations.102 As such, these 
three indicators effectively demonstrate a state’s overall health status.  
In the next two sections I seek to account for variation in these health indicators 
across a subset of African countries. I first assess whether, consistent with a large 
development literature, health outcomes are a function of government capacity and 
institutional commitment. I then analyze the degree to which Chinese health aid and 
World Bank health aid are leading to improvements in health outcomes via their effects 
on capacity and commitment.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 Garrett, Laurie, "The Challenge of Global Health," 2007. 
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The Effect of Capacity and Commitment on Health in sub-Saharan Africa 
 This section serves to establish the salient impact of health capacity and 
government commitment on infant mortality, maternal deaths, and life expectancy, as 
outlined above. Data was collected for twelve states in sub-Saharan Africa, including 
Angola, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Liberia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, and Tanzania from 2000 to 2013. All data for capacity and commitment 
variables and health outcomes is available from the World Bank World Development 
Indicators database.103  
 
Measuring Capacity and Institutional Commitment  
Capacity involves the “organizational, human, and financial resources that enable 
responsible authorities to improve health” and institutional commitment entails a state’s 
willingness to rule justly and make investments for the health of its citizenry.104  
Outcome indicators for health capacity building include skills, structures, attitudes, 
organizational processes, resource allocation, actions, policies, and responsibility for 
health promotion.105 It is difficult to assess indicators like organizational processes, 
attitudes, and responsibility in sub-Saharan Africa given data availability; but, the World 
Bank provides a number of variables that describe actions, policies, structures, and skills.  
I have defined births attended by skilled health staff (% of total births), hospital 
beds per 1,000 population, physicians per 1,000 population, contraceptive prevalence (% 
of women ages 15-49), improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access), and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 World Bank Group, ed, World Development Indicators 2014, 2014. 
104 On capacity: Aluttis, Chiotan, Michelsen, Costongs, and Brand, Public Health Capacity in the EU, 
2013, 13. On commitment: Becker, Pickett, and Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006.  
105 Hawe, Penelope, Lesley King, Michelle Noort, Christopher Jordens, and Beverley Lloyd, Indicators to 
Help with Capacity Building in Health Promotion, Australian Centre for Health Promotion, 2000. 
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improved access to water (% of population with access) as capacity indicators. The 
“births” and “physicians” variables account for the medical skill available to populations. 
Variables for “hospital beds,” improved access to water, and improved sanitation 
describe medical structures; the latter two also describe the distribution of water and 
sanitation facilities within a population. Contraceptive prevalence demonstrates coverage 
of medical care, and could also indicate access to pharmaceutical services, subsidized 
medication, or sexual health education.  
Government commitment to health is more difficult to quantify, as commitment is 
so deeply intertwined with capacity. Commitment and good governance involve ‘ruling 
justly’ and ‘investing in people.’106 I have defined immunization to diphtheria-tetanus-
pertussis (DPT, % of children ages 12-23 months), public health expenditure (% of 
government expenditure), and “Country Police and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating (1=low and 
6=high) as variables that define government commitment.107 Full DPT vaccination 
involves three vaccinations, each requiring a trip to the doctor. The Center for Global 
Development identifies DPT immunization as the best indicator of government 
commitment to health; this variable demonstrates investment in people in the “strength of 
the public health system in providing essential services.”108  
Government health expenditure also reflects a government’s willingness to invest 
in its people. This variable demonstrates the state’s prioritization of health as a public 
function via its spending decisions. Additionally, government commitment to health is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Becker, Pickett, and Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006, 1. 
107 The World Bank defines Immunization, DPT as the percentage of children aged 12-23 who have 
received three doses (the requirement for adequate immunization) of vaccine. "Indicators," World Bank, 
accessed March 31, 2015, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all. 
108 Becker, Pickett, and Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006, 2. 
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established in states with good governance, strong public service administration, and low 
levels of corruption.109 As such, I have also included “CPIA transparency” to capture 
standards of government accountability and commitment to equity in targeted states, 
which can include accountability to health and health equity.  
 
Control Variables  
 In estimating the effect of capacity and commitment on health outcomes, I also 
include a number of control variables that may affect either the provision or efficacy of 
aid or a country’s health status. GDP per capita is one of the best indicators for economic 
status, given that it depicts levels of employment, capital, and market productivity.110 
Population reflects a country’s size and is necessary to control for the fact that larger 
countries may receive more aid. Adult female literacy is indicative of maternal health 
care and social programming in that it indicates “resources and autonomy available to 
women.”111 Adult female literacy rates also impact infant mortality; well-educated 
mothers are more likely to visit doctors and have healthier pregnancies.112  
The prevalence rates of undernourishment and HIV serve to capture overall 
disease burden and poor food security.113 The inclusion of HIV prevalence also controls 
for receipt of aid, given that states with high HIV burdens are more likely to receive aid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Becker, Pickett, and Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006. 
110 "A Guide to Womenomics," The Economist, 2006, sec. Finance and Economics. 
111 McTavish, Sarah, Spencer Moore, Sam Harper, and John Lynch, "National Female Literacy, Individual 
Socio-Economic Status, and Maternal Health Care use in Sub-Saharan Africa," Social Science & 
Medicine 71, no. 11 (2010): 1958-1963. 
112 McTavish, Moore, Harper, and Lynch, “National Female Literacy,” 2010.  
113 Prevalence of HIV represents the total percentage of the population ages 15-49 infected with HIV. 
Prevalence of undernourishment represents the total percentage of the population suffering from 
undernourishment.  "Indicators," World Bank, 2005.  
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than those with lower caseloads.114 I have also controlled for minor and major armed 
conflict within a state during the designated time period.115   
 
Results 
 Before describing the results, it is important to describe the structure of the data. 
The unit of analysis is the country-year. Consistent with existing health studies, all data 
was averaged over five-year periods (sorted by country) to capture longer-term time 
trends and minimize outlier effects. All dependent variables are reported in the current 
period. All independent and control variables are lagged one period to help mitigate 
concerns about reverse causality.116 OLS regressions thus report the effect of a dependent 
variable in the current period in relation to independent and control variables in the 
previous period, and an error term.  
These regressions are formulated as such:  
IMt = α + β1Ct-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + ui 
 
MDt = α + β1Ct-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + ui 
 
LEt = α + β1Ct-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + ui 
 
where the dependent variables are given by IMt,, which refers to infant mortality in the 
current period, MDt, which refers to maternal deaths in the current period, and LEt, which 
refers to life expectancy in the current period. Ct-1, the independent variable represents 
individual indicators for commitment or capacity in the previous period. Controls are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 Mishra, Prachi, Newhouse, “Does Health Aid Matter?” 2009. 
115 Variables for prevalence of HIV and undernourishment, GDP per capita, population, fertility, adult 
female literacy, and CPIA equity for public resource use are available from the World Bank World 
Development Indicator Database on a country level for years 2000-2013. World Bank Group, ed, World 
Development Indicators 2014, 2014. Armed conflict is available from the PRIO/Uppsala Armed Conflict 
Database under the same parameters. Themnér, Lotta and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflict, 1946-
2013,” Journal of Peace Research 51(4), 2014.   
116 Mishra, Prachi, Newhouse, “Does Health Aid Matter?” 2009. 
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given by HIVt-1, LITt-1, UNt-1, POPt-1, GDPt-1, CONFt-1, which refer to HIV prevalence, 
adult female literacy, undernourishment prevalence, population, GDP, and armed conflict 
in the previous period, respectively.  
The regression results of the effect of different measures of commitment on IMt, 
MDt, and LEt are reported in Table 2. Model 1 analyzes the effect of immunization 
coverage on infant mortality, maternal deaths, and life expectancy. Model 2 refers to the 
effect of transparency on health outcomes. Model 3 describes the impact of public health 
expenditure on health outcomes.  
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Table 2: Impact of Commitment Variables on Health Outcomes 
 
Infant Mortality Maternal Deaths Life Expectancy 
 
Model 1 Model 2 
Model 
3 Model 1 Model 2 
Model 
3 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 Model 3 
Immuniz
ation 
 
  -1.11* 
(-0.09) 
  
-123.2* 
(18.99) 
  
0.20* 
(0.023) 
   
Transpa
rency  
-12.05 
(6.55) 
  
217.49 
(1197.6) 
  
2.69 
(1.68) 
 Health 
expendit
ure   
-3.65* 
(0.44)   
-
320.1* 
(82.14)   
0.75* 
(0.10) 
lag GDP 
per capita 
0.01* 
(0.002) 
0.01* 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.44) 
-0.83 
(0.54) 
-0.09 
(0.78) 
-1.39* 
(0.62) 
0.0006 
(0.001) 
0.0014 
(0.003) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
lag Adult 
female 
literacy 
0.38* 
(0.14) 
-0.47 
(0.27) 
-0.25 
(0.14) 
61.09* 
(28.30) 
-84.29 
(48.76) 
-15.20 
(26.96) 
-0.09* 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
lag 
Prevalenc
e of HIV 
1.73 
(1.32) 
2.40 
(2.78) 
1.23 
(1.60) 
-46.14 
(261.5) 
615.81 
(508.7) 
-10.88 
(297.1) 
-1.05* 
(0.33) 
-1.59* 
(0.71) 
-0.88* 
(0.36) 
lag 
Prevalenc
e of 
under-
nourishm
ent  
-0.19 
(0.19) 
 
 
-0.25 
(0.31) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.23) 
 
 
-47.96 
(37.92) 
 
 
-97.72 
(56.73) 
 
 
 
 
-35.25 
(43.15) 
 
 
0.13* 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.24* 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.09 
(0.06) 
 
 
lag Pop-
ulation 
 
-2.47 E-
07* 
(4.41 E-
08) 
8.33 
E-08 
(7.88 
E-08) 
-2.16 
E-08 
(4.90 
E-08) 
0.0002* 
(8.72 
E-06) 
0.0002* 
(0.0000
144) 
0.0003
* 
(9.12 
E-06) 
3.68 
E-08* 
(1.06 
E-08) 
-1.26 
E-08 
(2.02 
E-08) 
-5.36 
E-09 
(1.08 
E-08) 
lag 
Armed 
Conflict  
11.15* 
(5.15) 
-0.19 
(11.35) 
19.33* 
(5.93) 
-132.1 
(1019.1) 
597.02 
(2076.5) 
1011.7 
(1102.
5) 
-3.10* 
(1.29) 
-2.69 
(3.07) 
-4.07* 
(1.34) 
R^2 0.69 0.43 0.55 0.96 0.96 0.95 0.60 0.54 0.56 
N 106 62 106 106 62 106 97 53 97 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
 
The regression results of the effect of different measures of capacity on IMt, MDt, 
and LEt are reported in Table 3. Models 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 describe the impact of births 
attended by skilled health staff, contraceptive prevalence, physicians per 1,000 
population, improved sanitation facilities, improved water source, and hospital beds per 
1,000 population on health outcomes, respectively.  
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Table 3: Impact of Capacity Variables on Health Outcomes 
 
Infant Mortality 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
-0.04 
(-0.23) 
     Contraceptive 
prevalence  
-1.76* 
(0.23) 
    Physicians per 1,000 
population 
  
193.04* 
(39.77) 
   Improved sanitation 
facilities  
  
0.11 
(0.16) 
  
Improved water source  
 
 
 
-.722* 
(0.26) 
 
Hospital beds      
1.09 
-5.17 
lag GDP per capita 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.003 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
0.01 
(0.004) 
-0.01 
-0.01 
lag Adult female 
literacy 
-0.39 
(0.25) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
-0.64* 
(0.16) 
-0.60* 
(0.20) 
-0.30 
(0.20) 
-0.55 
-0.31 
lag Prevalence of HIV 
4.79 
(2.50) 
6.48* 
(1.94) 
2.71 
(1.94) 
5.35* 
(1.99) 
4.33* 
(1.94) 
5.55* 
-2.70 
lag Prevalence of 
undernourishment  
-0.64 
(0.40) 
-0.54 
(0.28) 
0.51 
(0.34) 
-0.40 
(0.30) 
-0.96* 
(0.34) 
-1.09* 
-0.45 
lag Population 
-4.25 
E-08 
(9.13 
E-08) 
-5.12 
E-08 
(5.76 
E-08) 
-2.44 
E-07* 
(6.85 
E-08) 
-5.77 
E-08 
(6.44 
E-08) 
-1.53 
E-07* 
(6.89 
E-08) 
3.43E-08 
-8.75E-08 
lag Armed Conflict  
32.24* 
(8.76) 
20.22* 
(6.98) 
10.59 
(7.86) 
28.04 
(7.95) 
33.11 
(7.36) 
22.57 
-14.46 
R^2 0.23 0.58 0.41 0.24 0.29 0.34 
N 90 86 88 106 106 58 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
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Table 3, cont.  
 
Maternal Deaths 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
23.01 
(-31.75) 
     
Contraceptive 
prevalence  
-214.12* 
(34.34) 
    
Physicians  
  
12958.2 
(7471.7) 
   Improved sanitation 
facilities  
  
55.78* 
(23.85) 
  
Improved water source  
 
 
 
-89.85* 
(40.46) 
 
Hospital beds      
-1271.22 
(927.40) 
lag GDP per capita 
-5.25* 
(-1.34) 
-5.42* 
(1.077) 
-1.27 
(0.71) 
-1.23 
(0.66) 
-1.07 
(0.64) 
-5.47* 
(2.32) 
lag Adult female 
literacy 
12.31 
(34.16) 
83.69* 
(29.97) 
-49.95 
(30.02) 
-67.93* 
(29.53) 
-10.76 
(30.69) 
9.68 
(55.76) 
lag Prevalence of HIV 
21.22 
(344.91) 
261.13 
(294.18) 
215.38 
(363.68) 
419.48 
(298.60) 
228.85 
(301.14) 
411.47 
(483.92) 
lag Prevalence of 
undernourishment  
-127.77* 
(55.21) 
-130.96* 
(43.30) 
-8.73 
(63.36) 
-60.94 
(44.26) 
-141.08* 
(53.10) 
-246.06* 
(80.98) 
lag Population 
0.0003* 
(0.00001) 
0.0003* 
(8.75 
E-06) 
0.0003* 
(0.00001) 
0.0003* 
(9.64 
E-06) 
0.0003* 
(0.00001) 
**0.0003 
(0.00002) 
lag Armed Conflict  
2499.98* 
(1207.6) 
1051.58 
(1060.41) 
-233.65 
(1476.5) 
1035.85 
(1189.46) 
2341.77* 
(1144.76) 
2464.82 
(2595.28) 
R^2 0.96 0.97 0.96 0.95 0.95 0.96 
N 90 86 88 106 106 58 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
 
 
 
 
	  34	  
Table 3, cont.  
Column1 Life Expectancy 
 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff 
-0.04 
(-0.23) 
     
Contraceptive 
prevalence  
0.37* 
(0.05) 
    
Physicians  
  
-31.69* 
(8.95) 
   Improved sanitation 
facilities  
  
-0.01 
(0.04) 
  Improved water 
source  
 
 
 
0.16* 
(40.46) 
 
Hospital beds      
0.07 
(1.09) 
lag GDP per capita 
-0.002                 
(0.01) 
0.0007 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.0004 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
lag Adult female 
literacy 
-0.39 
(0.25) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.10* 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.07) 
lag Prevalence of 
HIV 
4.79 
(2.50) 
-2.24* 
(0.42) 
-1.48* 
(0.44) 
-1.78* 
(0.43) 
-1.55* 
(0.42) 
-2.08* 
(0.61) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
-0.64 
(0.40) 
0.17* 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.08) 
0.20* 
(0.07) 
0.31* 
(0.08) 
0.31* 
(0.10) 
lag Population 
-4.25 
E-08 
(9.13 
E-08) 
1.19E-08 
(1.19 
E-08) 
3.52 
E-08* 
(1.48 
E-08) 
6.96E-09 
(1.37 
E-08) 
2.69E-08 
(1.45 
E-08) 
-8.84E-10 
(1.91 
E-08) 
lag Armed Conflict  
32.24* 
(8.76) 
-4.28* 
(1.51) 
-3.57* 
(1.78) 
-6.79* 
(1.69) 
-7.63* 
(1.57) 
-5.54 
(3.15) 
R^2 0.23 0.61 0.47 0.28 0.34 0.46 
N 90 78 79 97 97 53 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
   
These regressions demonstrate the salient effect of capacity and commitment on 
health. The relationships between commitment and health are particularly strong. As per 
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Models 1 and 3, hypothesis testing confirms that the coefficients for DPT immunization 
and health expenditure are significant for all health measures; DPT immunization and 
increased health expenditures are highly correlated with decreases to infant mortality and 
maternal deaths, and increases to life expectancy. Trends in infant mortality are 
particularly predominant; for every 1% increase of health expenditures as a share of 
public spending, infant mortality decreases by 3.65 deaths/1,000 live births.  
Figure 1, below, demonstrates the significant negative correlation between health 
expenditure and infant mortality, and the impressive gains to expenditure and health 
made by states like Liberia and Rwanda between 2000 and 2013. Likewise, immunization 
coverage demonstrates a significant negative correlation with infant mortality; for every 
1% increase in children immunized with the DPT vaccine, there is a 1.11 deaths/live 
births decline in infant mortality. However, there are no significant relationships reported 
between transparency and health outcomes, as per Model 2.  
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Figure 1: Impact of Public Health Expenditure on Infant Mortality, 2001-2012117 
 
 Correlations between capacity and health indicators are less uniform, but they 
demonstrate that a variety of capacity measures significantly impact health. Model 5 
demonstrates that contraceptive prevalence is significant with respect to decreases in 
infant mortality and maternal deaths and increases in life expectancy. Again, this variable 
is most highly correlated with infant mortality; for every 1% increase in contraceptive 
prevalence, infant mortality decreases by 1.75 deaths/1000 live births. Increased access to 
a water source is also significantly related to life expectancy, maternal deaths, and infant 
mortality; a 1% increase in water source access contributes to a .722 deaths/1000 live 
births decrease in infant mortality, a decrease in maternal deaths by 89.85 deaths, and a 
.155 year increase in life expectancy, as demonstrated by Model 8.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 All graphical relationships are depicted in terms of the years for which data available across countries is 
maximized. 
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 Regression analysis also demonstrated significant relationships between maternal 
deaths and sanitation (Model 7), as well as physicians and infant mortality and life 
expectancy (Model 6). According to regression output, a 1% increase in sanitation 
coverage yields an increase in maternal deaths of 55.77. Likewise, a 1 person increase in 
physicians per 1,000 population yields a 193.04 increase in infant deaths per 1,000 live 
births and a decrease to life expectancy of 31.69 years. The direction of these 
relationships is counterintuitive; an increase to physician and sanitation coverage should 
theoretically improve health indicators.  
However, graphical analysis of these puzzling relationships indicates that they are 
likely driven by the exceptionally poor health status of select states (most predominantly, 
Nigeria). Figure 2, below, demonstrates that most states, such as Guinea, Kenya, and 
Ghana, are able to achieve reductions to infant mortality alongside increases to physician 
coverage. However, while Nigeria and Angola also display a negative relationship 
between physician coverage and infant mortality, their outlying infant mortality rates 
skew the relationship upward. Figure 9 (listed in the Appendix) demonstrates a similar 
effect with regard to maternal deaths and sanitation coverage.  
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Figure 2: Impact of Physicians per 1,000 Population on Infant Mortality, 2003-2012 
 
 Overall, many variables for health capacity and government commitment are 
significantly related to improvements in health. However, it is important to note that 
several of these variables are limited by a large number of missing values; these missing 
values are reflected in the descriptive statistics listed in Table 10 (Appendix). Data 
averaging prior to analysis greatly reduced the number of missing values in the analysis. 
But even with this measure, data for CPIA transparency are missing 44 possible values 
out of a total of 105. Data for hospital beds per 1,000 population are missing 48 values, 
and data for contraceptive prevalence, births attended by skilled health staff, and 
physicians per 1,000 population are missing an average of 18 values each. This limitation 
may have introduced random bias in the regression results, possibly accounting for the 
lack of significant relationships for many of the above indicators.  
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Summary 
 Commitment and capacity are significantly related to improvements in infant 
mortality, maternal deaths, and life expectancy. In particular, immunization coverage and 
public health expenditures demonstrate strong direct correlations with life expectancy and 
inverse correlations with infant mortality and maternal deaths. Contraceptive prevalence 
and increased access to water are also significantly related to improvements in all heath 
outcomes.  
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The Effect of Chinese and World Bank Health Aid on Health Policies and Outcomes 
Having established a significant association between capacity and government 
commitment, I now assess if Chinese and World Bank health aid are increasing these 
intermediary variables and ultimately improving health outcomes. Aid to sub-Saharan 
Africa is measured in health-related financial commitments from China and the World 
Bank. All aid information is available from AidData.118 While the World Bank is a 
multilateral organization, unlike China (a bilateral donor), it is a Western organization for 
which AidData offers extensive data, and it exemplifies many of the characteristics of 
Western donors identified in relevant literature. Thus, the World Bank is a fitting 
representative for Western aid in this analysis.  
 Twelve states provided the maximum amount of data across both donors: Angola, 
Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, 
and Tanzania. After accessing all projects (on every state administrative level) from 2000 
to 2013 from the “Chinese Official Finance to Africa” and “World Bank-IBRD-IDA” 
databases, I condensed the data to include only health-related aid to the aforementioned 
states. As with the data for health indicators, all aid data was averaged over five years and 
lagged one year. 
Health-related aid includes all aid to the health sector, as well as any other project that 
indicated “health,” “food aid,” or “water sanitation,” in its description or sector codes.119 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Data for Chinese aid can be found from AidData’s 1.1.1. research release. Strange, Park, Tierney, Fucks, 
Dreher, and Ramachandran, “China’s Development Finance to Africa,” 2013. Data for World Bank aid can 
be found from AidData’s World Bank IBRD-IDA, Level 1, Version 1.0. Strandow, Daniel, Michael 
Findley, Daniel Nielson, and Joshua Powell, "The UCDP-AidData Codebook on Geo-Referencing Foreign 
Aid,” 2011. Uppsala Conflict Data Program (2011). 
119 In expanding my search beyond projects coded in the health sector, projects indicating “health” “food 
aid” and “water sanitation” include the following sectors: Government and Civil Society, Other Social 
Infrastructure and Services, Water Sanitation and Supply, Population Policies/Programmes and 
Reproductive Health, Health, Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing, Transport and Storage, Emergency 
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This definition expands ‘health aid’ to include vital health activities that are not directly 
assigned to the health sector by AidData. Inadequate drinking water, sanitation, and 
hygiene (WASH) impose severe health risks, particularly to people in low-income areas. 
WASH is responsible for the majority of the global burden of diarrheal diseases, as well 
as that of Dengue fever, hookworm, schistosomiasis, and many other infections 
worldwide.120 Thus, aid projects related to water access and sanitation impact global 
health in a significant manner and are relevant to this study.  
Likewise, food insecurity negatively impacts health, again to a greater degree in low-
income areas.121 Insufficient food intake and malnutrition contribute to anemia, infection, 
and developmental issues in children, as well as hypertension and diabetes in adults.122 
AidData includes nutrition and household food security in its codes for health sector 
activities; however, the majority of food aid projects are categorized in the Agriculture or 
Developmental Food Aid sectors.123 Thus, it is pertinent to incorporate provisions for 
food aid into this analysis of health assistance. By including health-related projects that 
have not been assigned to the health sector, I not only increase the size of my data set, but 
I incorporate critical instances of health funding into the analysis that would otherwise go 
unrecognized.  
Chinese Aid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Response, Unallocated/Unspecified, Other Multisector, Developmental Food Aid/Food Security 
Assistance, and Women in Development.  
120 Prüss-Ustün, A., J. Bartram, T. Clasen, J. M. Colford, O. Cumming, V. Curtis, S. Bonjour, et al, 
"Burden of Disease from Inadequate Water, Sanitation and Hygiene in Low- and Middle-Income Settings: 
A Retrospective Analysis of Data from 145 Countries," Tropical Medicine and International Health 19, no. 
8 (2014): 894-905. 
121Food insecurity refers to the “inability to afford nutritionally adequate and safe foods” Seligman, H. K., 
B. A. Laraia, and M. B. Kushel, "Food Insecurity is Associated with Chronic Disease among Low-Income 
NHANES Participants," The Journal of Nutrition 140, no. 2 (Feb, 2010): 304-310. 
122 Seligman, Laraia, and Kushel, "Food Insecurity is Associated with Chronic Disease,” 2010.  
123Strandow, Findley, Nielson, and Powell, “The UCDP-AidData Codebook on Geo-referencing Foreign 
Aid. Version 1.1,” 2011. 
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OLS regressions measuring the impact of lagged Chinese aid on health indicators 
are given by:  
IMt = α + β1CHIt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
MDt = α + β1CHIt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
LEt = α + β1CHIt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
Regression output is reported in Table 4. The model is the same, but the independent 
variable is given by CHIt-1: Chinese health aid in the previous period.  
 
Table 4: The Impact of Chinese Aid on Health Outcomes  
 
Infant Mortality Maternal Deaths Life Expectancy 
 Model 10 
lag Chinese aid 
9.01E-08* 
(3.76E-08) 
7.29E-06 
(5.89E-06) 
-2.66E-08* 
(8.17E-09) 
lag GDP per capita 
0.001 
(0.004) 
-1.03 
(0.67) 
0.003 
(0.002) 
lag Adult female literacy  
-0.68* 
(0.19) 
-52.26 
(29.13) 
0.11* 
(0.04) 
lag Prevalence of HIV  
6.26* 
(1.98) 
422.60 
(310.23) 
-2.03* 
(0.41) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
-0.47 
(0.29) 
-78.47 
(44.80) 
0.25* 
(0.07) 
lag Population  
-5.53E-08 
(6.19E-08) 
0.0003* 
(9.70E-06) 
4.06E-09 
(1.28E-08) 
lag Armed Conflict 
30.30* 
(7.33) 
1970.11 
(1149.14) 
-7.42* 
(1.54) 
R^2 0.28 0.95 0.36 
N 106 106 97 
states  12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
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These regressions (Model 10) demonstrate significance with respect to infant 
mortality and life expectancy, but not maternal deaths. However, the coefficient for infant 
mortality is positive and the coefficient for life expectancy is negative; the model 
suggests that an increase to Chinese aid contributes to an increase in infant mortality and 
a decrease to life expectancy. This relationship contradicts existing studies that find aid 
has a significant effect in reducing infant mortality.124 
 Upon further analysis, however, it appears that these counterintuitive associations 
are driven by an outlying relationship between Chinese aid and Angolan health. Angola’s 
health profile is the worst of all states included in the analysis. Infant mortality ranges 
from 128.3 to 106.98 deaths/1,000 live births from 2000-2013, compared to a regional 
average of 73. During the same period, life expectancy increased from 45.20478 to 
51.464 years, compared to a regional average of 55. However, Angola received 
dramatically higher amounts of aid from China than have the other studied countries, as 
per Figure 10 (Appendix), likely as a result of Angola’s vast mineral resources. These 
resources have translated into large amounts of aid to a variety of sectors; Angola has 
accepted a number of development assistance packages from China in exchange for oil or 
mineral exports that included health-related projects.125 
Thus, the combination of these factors accounts for the Angola anomaly, which 
drives the association between Chinese aid and poor health conditions. This effect is 
visible in Figure 3; while Angolan infant mortality decreases from 2000 to 2013 along 
with an increase to its share of Chinese aid, its level of infant mortality is demonstrably 
higher than the majority of other nations in 2013, skewing the relationship. Additionally, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 Mishra, Prachi, Newhouse, “Does Health Aid Matter?” 2009. 
125 Bräutigam, Deborah, "Aid ‘With Chinese Characteristics,’ 2011. 
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when Angolan data is removed from analysis, hypothesis testing confirms that Chinese 
aid has no significant impact on either life expectancy or infant mortality, as reported in 
Table 11 (Appendix).  
 
Figure 3: The Impact of Chinese Aid on Infant Mortality, 2001-2013 
 
 
For the most part, regressions demonstrate no significant relationships between 
Chinese aid and health capacity and commitment (Models 11 and 12). These regressions 
are reported in Table 5 and 6. Here, the model is given by 
Ct = α + CHIβ1t-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + ui 
where the dependent variable, Ct, refers to individual variables for capacity and 
commitment in the current period, compared to the independent variable, Chinese aid in 
the previous period.  
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Table 5: The Impact of Chinese Aid on Capacity Indicators 
 
Births 
attended 
by skilled 
health 
staff 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 
 
Physician
s 
 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
 
Improved 
water 
source 
 
Hospital 
beds 
 
 Model 11 
lag Chinese 
aid 
-6.52E-08* 
(2.19E-08) 
-2.34E-08 
(1.99E-08) 
-1.33E-10 
(9.64E-
11) 
-7.40E-08* 
(2.45E-08) 
-2.95E-08 
(1.61E-
08) 
-2.83E-10 
(1.49E-
09) 
lag GDP per 
capita 
0.02* 
(0.004) 
-0.0008 
(0.004) 
0.00003* 
(0.00002) 
0.03* 
(0.01) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
lag Adult 
female literacy  
0.47* 
(0.10) 
0.43* 
(0.09) 
-0.00003 
(0.0005) 
0.44* 
(0.12) 
0.37* 
(0.08) 
0.02* 
(0.009) 
lag Prevalence 
of HIV  
-0.79 
(1.12) 
-0.55 
(1.02) 
0.02* 
(0.005) 
-2.31 
(1.24) 
-1.64* 
(0.81) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
lag Prevalence 
of Under-
nourishment  
-0.55* 
(0.17) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
-0.005* 
(0.0007) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.67* 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
lag Population  
-2.27E-07* 
(3.28E-08) 
2.18E-08 
(3.03E-08) 
1.10E-09* 
(1.57E-
10) 
-8.59E-08* 
(3.83E-08) 
-1.23E-
07* 
(2.51E-
08) 
-2.23E-09 
(2.80E-
09) 
lag Armed 
Conflict 
1.43 
(4.07) 
-10.67* 
(3.74) 
0.07* 
(0.02) 
11.84* 
(4.62) 
3.72 
(3.03) 
0.65 
(0.44) 
R^2 0.76 0.58 0.82 0.58 0.63 0.44 
N 91 89 95 97 97 64 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
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Table 6: The Impact of Chinese Aid on Commitment Indicators  
 
Immunization, DPT 
Public health 
expenditure CPIA transparency 
 Model 12 
lag Chinese aid 
  
-8.61E-08* 
(2.43E-08) 
-7.04E-09 
(6.85E-09) 
-2.05E-09* 
(6.42E-10) 
lag GDP per capita 
  
0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.0003* 
(0.0001) 
lag Adult female 
literacy  
  
0.90* 
(0.12) 
0.10* 
(0.03) 
0.03* 
(0.004) 
lag Prevalence of 
HIV  
  
-4.01* 
(1.28) 
-1.31* 
(0.35) 
-0.26* 
(0.04) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
  
0.27 
(0.19) 
0.15* 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
lag Population  
  
-1.74E-07* 
(4.00E-08) 
1.82E-08 
(1.07E-08) 
4.23E-09* 
(1.33E-09) 
lag Armed Conflict 
  
-16.51* 
(4.75) 
-3.83* 
(1.29) 
-0.52* 
(0.19) 
R^2 0.66 0.24 0.56 
N 106 97 74 
states  12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
 
Four significant and negative relationships exist, however, between Chinese aid 
and CPIA transparency, immunization coverage, sanitation coverage, and births attended 
by skilled health staff. Again, it is likely that these results are due to outliers. Figure 4 
demonstrates the relationship between Chinese aid and transparency; Angola and 
Cameroon receive very high amounts of Chinese aid but both maintain lower-than-
average transparency ratings. 
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Figure 4: The Impact of Chinese aid on Transparency, 2005-2013 
 
Likewise, the relationship between Chinese aid and sanitation facilities may be skewed 
by Ghana’s poor sanitation coverage. Ghana received a large amount of Chinese health 
aid from 2000 to 2012, but its percentage of improved sanitation facilities in 2012 
remained much lower than the regional average, as demonstrated in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: The Impact of Chinese Aid on Increased Sanitation Facilities, 2001-2012 
 
Figures 11 and 12 (listed in the Appendix), also depict outliers: states receiving 
extremely high amounts of Chinese health aid report below-average values for 
immunization coverage and births attended by skilled health staff. Thus, not only does 
the analysis demonstrate no direct relationship between Chinese aid and health, but it also 
offers no significant mechanism by which Chinese aid could be influencing the 
determinants of health (capacity and commitment). This finding rejects the initial 
hypothesis that China’s use of tied aid improves health capacity.  
 However, the validity of data on Chinese aid is limited given that it derived from 
media reports, rather than official reporting from the Chinese government.126 This 
methodology, while the best option available given the lack of official reports, lends itself 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Media reports containing pertinent Chinese aid information are found and coded by student research 
assistants. Strandow, Findley, Nielson, and Powell, “The UCDP-AidData codebook on Geo-referencing 
Foreign Aid,” 2011. 
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to error in that it likely suffers from random bias. Media reports may fail to account for 
all financial transactions between China and sub-Saharan Africa, or may not include all 
pertinent sector/commitment information. Thus, the Chinese data suffers the limitation of 
many missing data points, or aid projects that were omitted from the analysis due to 
vague activity descriptions. These sources of error may contribute to the insignificant 
associations between Chinese aid and health outcomes reached by this analysis.  
 
World Bank Aid  
 OLS regressions describing World Bank aid are reported in Table 7 and 
demonstrate significant relationships with infant mortality, maternal deaths, and life 
expectancy. These regressions are given by: 
IMt = α + β1WBt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
MDt = α + β1WBt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
LEt = α + β1WBt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + 
ui 
 
Here, the independent variable is given by WBt-1, or lagged World Bank aid.  
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Table 7: The Impact of World Bank aid on Health Outcomes 
 
 
Infant Mortality Maternal Deaths Life Expectancy 
 Model 13 
lag World Bank aid 
-9.31E-08* 
(3.70E-08) 
-0.00002* 
(5.53E-06) 
2.17E-08* 
(7.62E-09) 
lag GDP per capita 
0.01 
(0.004) 
5.53E-06 
(0.61) 
0.007 
(0.002) 
lag Adult female literacy  
-0.44* 
(0.18) 
-18.14 
(27.39) 
0.06 
(.04) 
lag Prevalence of HIV  
4.53* 
(1.94) 
201.99 
(290.67) 
-1.65* 
(0.41) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
-0.45 
(0.28) 
-77.96 
(42.61) 
0.21* 
(0.07) 
lag Population  
7.51E-08 
(8.31E-08) 
0.0003* 
(0.00001) 
-2.52E-08 
(1.74E-08) 
lag Armed Conflict 
26.94* 
(7.40) 
1351.91 
(1107.36) 
-6.48* 
(1.57) 
R^2 0.28 0.95 0.34 
N 106 106 97 
states  12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
 
 
For every $100,000,000 increase in World Bank aid, life expectancy increases by 
2.17 years (Model 13). For every $100,000 increase in aid, maternal deaths decrease by 
1.89. The relationship is most striking between World Bank aid and infant mortality. A 
$100,000,000 increase to World Bank aid contributes to 9.931 death/1,000 live births 
decrease in infant mortality. As depicted in Figure 6, most states follow a general trend of 
increases to aid alongside decreases to infant mortality. Nigeria and Tanzania, in 
particular, made impressive gains to infant mortality alongside dramatic increases to 
World Bank aid over the time period. States like Liberia and Rwanda, however, 
demonstrate the same trend, but achieve significant decreases to infant mortality with 
only a slight increase to World Bank aid.  
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Figure 6: The Impact of World Bank Aid on Infant Mortality, 2001-2012 
 
The influence of World Bank aid on capacity and commitment indicators proved 
more significant than that of Chinese aid; these relationships shed light on the 
mechanisms by which World Bank aid may be increasing health. Here, the model is 
given by 
Ct = α + β1WBt-1 + β2HIVt-1 + β3LITt-1 + β4UNt-1 + β5POPt-1 + β6GDPt-1 + β7CONFt-1 + ui 
where the dependent variable, Ct, refers to individual variables for capacity and 
commitment in the current period, compared to the independent variable, World Bank aid 
in the previous period. Regression output measuring the impact of World Bank aid on 
capacity and commitment is reported in Tables 8 and 9.  
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Table 8: The Impact of World Bank Aid on Capacity Indicators 
 
Births 
attended by 
skilled 
health staff 
Contraceptive 
prevalence 
 
Physician
s 
 
Improved 
sanitation 
facilities 
Improved 
water 
source 
Hospital 
beds 
 
 Model 14 
lag World 
Bank aid 
-5.10E-08* 
(1.90E-08) 
5.18E-08* 
(1.67E-08) 
-6.58E-11 
(9.83E-11) 
-5.16E08* 
(2.30E-08) 
-2.06E-08 
(1.49E-08) 
1.04E-09 
(1.45E-09) 
lag GDP per 
capita 
0.01* 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.004) 
0.00003* 
(0.00001) 
0.02* 
(0.001) 
-0.005 
(0.003) 
-0.0005 
(0.0004) 
lag Adult 
female 
literacy  
0.51* 
(0.11) 
0.31* 
(0.09) 
-0.0002 
(0.0005) 
0.45* 
(0.13) 
0.37* 
(0.08) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
lag 
Prevalence 
of HIV  
-0.95 
(1.14) 
0.29 
(0.98) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-1.82 
(1.25) 
-1.45 
(0.81) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
lag 
Prevalence 
of Under-
nourishment  
-0.60* 
(0.17) 
0.25 
(0.15) 
-0.01* 
(0.001) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.74* 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
lag 
Population  
-1.29E-07* 
(4.50E-08) 
-5.82E-08 
(3.96E-08) 
1.23E-09* 
(2.19E-10) 
3.90E-09 
(5.25E-08) 
-8.73E-08* 
(3.40E-08) 
-3.88E-09 
(3.66E-09) 
lag Armed 
Conflict 
0.04 
(4.16) 
-8.38* 
(3.63) 
0.06* 
(0.02) 
11.92* 
(4.73) 
3.75 
(3.06) 
0.70 
(0.43) 
R^2 0.75 0.62 0.82 0.56 0.59 0.45 
N 91 89 95 97 97 64 
states  12 12 12 12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
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Table 9: The Impact of World Bank Aid on Commitment Indicators 
 
Immunization, DPT 
Public health 
expenditure CPIA transparency 
 Model 15 
lag World Bank aid 
  
5.26E-08* 
(2.49E-08) 
1.24E-08* 
(6.21E-09) 
2.70E-09* 
(6.88E-10) 
lag GDP per capita 
  
0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.004* 
(0.001) 
-0.0002* 
(0.0001) 
lag Adult female literacy  
  
0.70* 
(0.12) 
0.08* 
(0.03) 
0.02* 
(0.04) 
lag Prevalence of HIV  
  
-2.62* 
(1.31) 
-1.18* 
(0.34) 
-0.21* 
(0.04) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
  
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.15* 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
lag Population  
  
-2.43E-07* 
(5.60E-08) 
3.24E-10 
(1.42E-08) 
2.12E-10 
(1.76E-09) 
lag Armed Conflict 
  
-14.41* 
(4.99) 
-3.43* 
(1.28) 
-0.44* 
(0.19) 
R^2 0.63 0.27 0.59 
N 106 97 74 
states  12 12 12 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
 
World Bank aid is significantly related to increases in all indicators for 
government commitment to health (Model 15). These results are in keeping with the 
hypothesis that World Bank aid targets commitment to health with policies of 
conditionality. Transparency ratings increase by .27 units for every $100,000,000 
increase to World Bank aid; transparency and World Bank aid are the most highly 
correlated variables in this analysis. $100,000,000 increases to World Bank aid also yield 
a 1.24% increase to public expenditures on health and a 5.26% increase to DPT 
immunization coverage. The relationship between public expenditures on health is 
depicted in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7: The Impact of World Bank Aid on Public Health Expenditures, 2001-2012 
 
The impact of World Bank health aid on health expenditures is visually slight, but 
significant. The simultaneous increases to both health aid and health expenditure are 
prominent in states like Angola and Ghana, but again, Rwanda and Liberia demonstrate 
significant increases to health expenditure with only a small increase to World Bank aid. 
The overall result, however, contradicts theories suggesting the ineffectiveness of 
development assistance for health in increasing recipient health expenditures. Proponents 
of this theory suggest that with an influx of health-related funds from abroad, developing 
countries may opt to divert expenditures ear-marked for health to other areas.127 
However, the majority of states in this analysis demonstrate increases to health 
expenditures alongside increases to health aid.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Lu, Schneider, Gubbins, Leach-Kemon, Jamison, and Murray, “Public Financing of Health in 
Developing Countries,” 2008. 
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World Bank health aid also demonstrates statistically significant relationships 
with a number of capacity indicators (Model 14). For every $100,000,000 increase in 
World Bank aid, contraceptive prevalence increases by 5.18%. However, World Bank aid 
demonstrates negative relationships with sanitation coverage and births attended by 
skilled health staff. Graphical representations of these relationships suggest that outliers 
drive these associations. As demonstrated by Figures 13 and 14 (listed in the Appendix), 
most countries demonstrate increasing relationships (of varying magnitudes) between 
World Bank aid and sanitation and births attended by skilled health staff. However, 
despite improvements, some of the top recipients of World Bank aid, such as Ethiopia 
and Ghana demonstrated persistently lower-than-average sanitation coverage. Similarly, 
Ethiopia’s levels of births attended by skilled health staff in 2001 and 2012 are extremely 
low, and skew their relationship with World Bank health aid downward.  
World Bank aid demonstrates significant association with all indicators for 
government commitment, in keeping with the hypothesis. Additionally, the Center for 
Global Development identifies “contraceptive prevalence” as a secondary indicator for 
government commitment. While contraceptive prevalence is a function of accessible 
pharmaceuticals and health educators, it may also be dependent on government 
implementation of family planning programs.128 Thus, if we accept this conceptualization 
of “contraceptive prevalence” as an indicator for commitment, then the World Bank’s 
influence on government commitment over health capacity is further strengthened.  
However, the data for World Bank aid is limited in that AidData only reports the 
World Bank’s financial commitments, rather than disbursements. Commitments comprise 
“new undertakings entered in the year in question (regardless of when disbursements are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Becker, Loren, Jessica Pickett, and Ruth Levine, "Measuring Commitment to Health," 2006. 
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expected)” and additions to earlier agreements.129 Disbursements, however, reflect the 
transaction of resources to a recipient country or agency, and may take several years to 
reach the recipient in full. For this reason, comprehensive disbursement data is difficult to 
track.130 Thus, commitment values for any given year may not reflect the actual amount 
of aid delivered to a recipient. The use of lags attempts to account for disbursement 
delay, but a one-year lag may be insufficient without further review of transaction 
histories. Thus, analysis of World Bank aid may be biased in that yearly transactions may 
be overestimated, as a sum of commitments rather than disbursements.131   
 
Summary 
The World Bank, in its employment of conditional policies, may improve 
government transparency, accountability, and service delivery mechanisms to better 
health. Increases to World Bank aid are significantly related to improvements in infant 
mortality, maternal deaths, and life expectancy. Additionally, World Bank aid is highly 
correlated with increases to all indicators for government commitment, and with 
contraceptive prevalence, which may also provide some indication of institutional 
commitment to health programming.  
  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Tierney, Michael J., Daniel L. Nielson, Darren G. Hawkins, J. Timmons Roberts, Michael G. Findley, 
Ryan M. Powers, Bradley Parks, Sven E. Wilson, and Robert L. Hicks, More Dollars than Sense: Refining 
Our Knowledge of Development Finance Using AidData, World Development 39 no 11 (2011), 1891-
1906. 
130 Tierney, Nielson, Hawkins, Roberts, Findley, Powers, Parks, Wilson, and Hicks, “More Dollars than 
Sense,” 2011. 
131 Data describing Chinese aid is also reported in commitments for the sake of continuity. 
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Discussion 
Does World Bank Aid Cause Better Health?  
Empirical analysis points to a significant relationship between World Bank health 
aid and government commitment to health as well as improvement in health outcomes in 
twelve African countries. These results are consistent with the theoretical supposition that 
targeted, conditional aid represents an effective lever to not only improve the livelihoods 
of citizens in recipient countries but also governance itself. Another important theoretical 
implication that follows is this suggestion that the bureaucratic impositions and 
hindrances to capacity from World Bank assistance do not outweigh the institutional 
changes brought about through conditionality.  
Before any conclusions can be drawn, however, it is necessary to ascertain if 
World Bank health aid is merely correlated with, rather than a precipitate of, both 
institutional change and improved health indicators. Parallel trends in health aid and 
decreased infant mortality in countries like Tanzania, Ghana, or Ethiopia, for example, do 
not prove that better health is the result of conditional World Bank assistance. Surely 
health conditions and aid policy have an interactive effect—health conditions determine 
aid policy as much as vice versa.  
There are a number of reasons why a donor would extend aid to a particular state. 
Donors may participate in the business of “picking winners;” countries with pre-existing 
trends toward better health might receive more attention from opportunistic donors 
seeking to write easy success stories.132 Additionally, donors may allocate more aid to 
states that have already demonstrated greater commitment to health and/or good 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 Rogerson, Andrew, "What if Development Aid Were Truly “Catalytic”?" Background Note London: 
ODI (2011). 3. 
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governance, in which the health aid is more likely to have a stronger effect.133  To draw 
firmer conclusions on the causal effect of World Bank aid, further analysis is necessary. 
At a minimum, if World Bank aid is driving the improvements in health seen since 2000, 
we would expect infusions of conditional health assistance from the World Bank to 
precede improvements in government healthcare and health outcomes.  
To determine if this is the case, I analyzed those countries with the most dramatic 
improvements in health outcomes and to determine whether World Bank health aid 
seemed to induce government commitment to healthcare and ultimately better health 
outcomes. Tanzania, for example, has made significant gains to capacity, commitment, 
and overall health from 2000 to 2013. These gains correspond to increasing shares in 
World Bank aid. By 2013, Tanzania achieved an infant mortality rate of 36.4 deaths per 
1,000 live births— the lowest in the analysis. Additionally, in the past decade, Tanzania 
has seen expansions to HIV/AIDS treatment coverage, contraceptive prevalence, births 
attended by skilled health staff, and access to health facilities.134 Transparency ratings 
declined from 3.5 to 3 over this period, but health expenditures were higher than the 
regional average and DPT immunization coverage increased from 79 to 91% from 2000-
2013. Also, public health spending has increased eight-fold since 2000. Moreover, 
according to USAID’s Health System Assessment for Tanzania, the government has 
engaged in extensive health sector reform since 1993. Subsequent actions have included 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133 Neumayer, Eric, "The Determinants of Aid Allocation by Regional Multilateral Development Banks and 
United Nations Agencies," International Studies Quarterly 47, no. 1 (2003): 101-122. 
134 Tanzania Health System Assessment: USAID, 2010, http://www.healthsystemassessment.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Tanzania_HSA_final_MCDV.pdf 
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community health funds for poor/rural citizens, a national insurance fund for civil 
servants, and social security programming to improve availability and access to care.135 
Thus, the Tanzanian government’s demonstrated commitment to health has 
preceded the analyzed time period, and this infusion of World Bank health aid. It may be 
that World Bank aid caused improvements to health commitment during the 1990s; 
however, further research as to the history of Tanzanian/World Bank relations suggests 
that this may not be true. Despite the implementation of health reforms in 1993, the 
Tanzanian government failed to commit to economic reforms from 1992 to 1995, 
prompting the World Bank to scale back its financial support during this period.136 This 
hiccup in the relationship between the World Bank and Tanzania seems to undermine the 
notion that World Bank aid precipitated Tanzania’s surge in health commitment in 1993. 
Additionally, the data does not indicate any increase to World Bank health aid prompting 
improvements in health commitment from 2000-2013.  
Ghana also demonstrates vast improvements to commitment, capacity, and health 
outcomes alongside increases to health aid. Ghana’s transparency rating is 4/6 for the 
majority of observed time periods, the highest of any other analyzed state. Immunization 
coverage reached 90% in 2013, health expenditures met regional averages, and indicators 
for life expectancy, infant mortality, and maternal deaths improved steadily from 2000 to 
2013. While quality and distribution of services are lacking, Ghana’s health system is 
strong; the government has facilitated programs to increase health personnel and increase 
public insurance coverage.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Tanzania Health System Assessment: USAID, 2010. 
136 The Hellenier Process, an action of the Danish government, helped Tanzania to restore relations with 
donors beginning in 1994. Muganda, Anna, Tanzania’s Economic Reforms — and Lessons Learned: 
IBRD/World Bank, 2004. 
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In 2003, the Ghanaian government issued the National Health Insurance Act, an 
attempt to transition to a uniform national healthcare system, one that would alleviate 
financial barriers to medical care. Ghana also began to earmark revenue for health 
spending in 2003 to stabilize public health contributions.137 Thus, Ghana made significant 
demonstrations of government commitment to health in 2003. Data for World Bank aid, 
however, reveals that health aid to Ghana increased after 2003, rather than before. As 
with Tanzania, data does not indicate any discernable pattern describing an increase to 
World Bank health aid followed by an improvement to any commitment indicator or 
health outcome.   
There are no apparent trends in World Bank aid allocation that indicate a causal 
relationship between World Bank health aid and increased commitment with regard to the 
analyzed countries. The same can be said of the relationships between World Bank aid 
and improved health outcomes. Interestingly, World Bank health aid to Ghana increased 
after 2003, when the government invested heavily in health programming. This suggests 
that the World Bank may have allocated health aid based on Ghana’s already 
demonstrated commitment. However, this is just one case. Further analysis is necessary 
to determine the motivations behind World Bank health aid, and whether or not it 
precipitates improvements to commitment or overall health.   
 
Why Isn’t Chinese Health Aid Effective?  
Regression analysis demonstrates that Chinese health aid – after accounting for 
the outlying health profile of Angola – has no significant impact on infant mortality, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 Saleh, Karima, The Health Sector in Ghana: A Comprehensive Assessment, World Bank Publications, 
2012. 
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maternal deaths, or life expectancy. Additionally, results suggest that Chinese aid poses 
no benefit to either health capacity or commitment. These results do not support the 
hypothesis that China’s use of tied aid streamlines the aid delivery process, bypassing 
ineffective government to produce better health capacity.  
Why does Chinese aid demonstrate no significant relationship with health? Are 
critics of the Chinese model correct in that Chinese aid perpetuates bad government and 
does not improve human development indicators? Expanded analysis of Chinese aid 
composition may shed light on these questions. Figure 8 demonstrates that Chinese aid is 
primarily composed of assistance for infrastructure, equipment, and personnel. These 
results are not surprising, and they support conventional claims that Chinese practices 
favor infrastructure and short-term outputs.138  
 
Figure 8: Chinese Aid Allocation by Sector 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138 Tan-Mullins, Mohan, and Power. “Redefining ‘Aid,’” 2010  
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On the other hand, data indicates that World Bank aid is comprised of general 
health system support and community health development to a greater degree than 
Chinese aid, as shown in Figure 15 (Appendix). This policy adheres to prevailing 
theories, which posit that aid aimed at the improvement of overarching health systems is 
more effective than narrower, area-specific transactions.139 Rwanda’s agency over its aid 
allocation is demonstrative of this effect; in the early 2000s, donors extended Rwanda 
large amounts of aid for HIV-specific programming. Instead, Rwanda used these funds to 
foster a better primary care system, given that “HIV does not exist in a vacuum.”140 
Support for health systems is ultimately more useful than issue-specific aid. It may be 
that aid for medical consumables and infrastructure operates in a similar way: without a 
functional system in which to use such infrastructure effectively, health will not improve 
in the long term. Thus, the disparity in Chinese and World Bank sector allocation 
suggests that direct increases to capacity may be insufficient to improve health services in 
poor countries. 
However, concentrated Chinese aid to sub-Saharan Africa is a relatively new 
phenomenon; it may be that Chinese infrastructure aid has not yet taken effect. 
Furthermore, there is certainly a localized impact of Chinese aid; Jackson Doe Memorial 
Hospital, which China has helped to construct, was recently the site of the first 
neurological surgeries performed in Liberia. The hospital’s construction has attracted 
specialized research and medical personnel to Liberia’s Nimba County.141 Given the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Piva, Paolo and Dodd, “Where Did All the Aid Go?” 2008. 
140 Emery, "Rwanda's Historic Health Recovery,” 2013. 
141 "Liberia: First Brain Surgery Performed at Tappita Hospital," AllAfrica, Accessed May 19, 
2015. http://allafrica.com/stories/201404101087.html.	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localized, rather than system-wide nature of Chinese infrastructure aid, a sub-national 
analysis may be more prudent to determine its impact in future studies.  
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Conclusion 
 The development of new granular datasets regarding Chinese aid provides the 
academic community with an important chance to empirically evaluate the effect of 
assistance from this increasingly important donor. China’s rising influence in the aid 
community has coincided with increasingly negative perceptions of established Western 
practices. However, this analysis demonstrates no statistically significant relationships 
between Chinese health aid and health capacity, commitment, or overall health. While 
further analysis and better data are needed to draw more definitive conclusions, it appears 
that China’s employment of tied aid and infrastructure development is not a short-term 
silver bullet in terms of improving health outcomes. In fact, healthcare policies and health 
indicators have improved dramatically in the absence of Chinese health aid.  
 World Bank health aid, on the other hand, is significantly associated with 
achievements in government commitment and overall health. Again, further analysis of 
World Bank health aid is necessary to determine if these relationships are truly causal, 
but these results suggest that the World Bank’s conditional aid policies do not appear to 
undermine healthcare as some critics claim. This affirmation is timely, given the recent 
challenges posed by China’s proposed Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. While the 
World Bank would do well to ease the detriments associated with conditionality, such as 
the bureaucratic burden imposed on recipient states, it appears that traditional aid policies 
win the day in producing better health outcomes in developing states. And, it is essential 
that evaluation of aid effectiveness continue, lest donors fall into complacency. Future 
research to better understand the motivations of World Bank aid allocation could go a 
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long way in determining whether its policies actually precipitate sustainable 
developments in healthcare.  
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APPENDIX 
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Year 168 2006.5 4.04 2000 2013 
Chinese aid (USD 
current) 168 2.93E+07 1.27E+08 0 1.00E+09 
World Bank aid 
(USD current) 168 7.15E+07 1.25E+08 0 7.81E+08 
Infant Mortality, per 
1,000 live births 168 73.22 22.25 36.4 128.3 
Number of Maternal 
Deaths 48 8910 11835.31 980 50000 
Life Expectancy at 
birth, total (years) 156 54.99 4.43 45.20 63.49 
Births attended by 
skilled health staff (% 
of total) 38 44.96 16.60 5.6 69 
Contraceptive 
prevalence (% of 
women ages 15-49) 36 20.49 11.43 5.6 51.6 
Physicians, per 1,000 
population 45 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.41 
Improved sanitation 
facilities (% of 
population with 
access) 156 27.82 17.02 6.6 63.8 
Improved water 
source (% of 
population with 
access) 156 60.84 11.65 29 87.2 
Hospital beds per 
1,000 population 28 1.09 1.15 0.1 6.3 
Immunization, DPT 
(% of children, ages 
12-23 months)  168 69.71 20.84 25 99 
CPIA Transparency, 
accountability, and 
corruption in the 
public sector rating 
(1=low 6=high) 104 2.93 0.48 2 4 
Public health 
expenditure, (% of 
government 
expenditures) 156 9.96 4.25 2.86 24.01 
Population, total  168 3.44E+07 3.97E+07 2891968 1.74E+08 
Prevalence of HIV, 168 3.03 2.08 0.4 9.3 
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total, (% of 
population ages 15-
49) 
Prevalence of 
undernourishment (% 
of population) 156 26.40 12.48 5 55.7 
Armed Conflict (0= 
no conflict, 1= minor 
conflict, 2 = major 
conflict) 168 0.28 0.51 0 2 
GDP per capita USD 
current  168 811.58 964.91 112.24 5783.37 
Adult female literacy 
rate (% of females 
ages 15 and above) 29 41.94 20.57 8.94 77.89 
 
Table 11: Impact of Chinese Aid on Health Outcomes, No Angola 
TABLE 4 infant mortality maternal deaths life expectancy 
lag Chinese aid 
  
-2.19E-09 
(4.11E-08) 
4.29E-06 
(7.37E-06) 
-6.91E-09 
(9.48E-09) 
lag GDP per capita 
  
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-5.70E+00 
(1.15) 
0.005 
(0.002) 
lag Adult female literacy  
  
-0.65 
(0.15) 
-35.91 
(26.55) 
0.14 
(0.03) 
lag Prevalence of HIV  
  
8.24 
(1.51) 
602.72 
(271.03) 
-2.48 
(0.33) 
lag Prevalence of 
Undernourishment  
  
-1.34 
(0.25) 
-199.30 
(45.61) 
0.33 
(0.05) 
lag Population  
  
-2.96E-08 
(4.91E-08) 
0.0003 
(8.79E-06) 
3.06E-09 
(1.04E-08) 
lag Armed Conflict 
  
26.61 
(6.04) 
1684.51 
(1082.30) 
-5.57 
(1.32) 
R^2 0.43 0.96 0.54 
N 100 100 92 
states  11 11 11 
*: significant for two-sided t-test at α = 0.05 
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Figure 9: Impact of Improved Sanitation Facilities on Maternal Deaths, 2001-2012 
 
Figure 10: Chinese Aid Allocation by Country 
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Figure 11: Impact of Chinese Aid on Immunization Coverage 
 
Figure 12: Impact of Chinese Aid on Births Attended by Skilled Health Staff 
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Figure 13: Impact of World Bank Aid on Improved Sanitation Facilities, 2001-2012 
 
Figure 14: Impact of World Bank Aid on Births Attended By Skilled Health Staff, 
2001- 2012 
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Figure 15: World Bank Aid Allocation by Sector 
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